Security-Enhanced SE Linux is a version of Linux with additional security features. The initial version of SE Linux was released by NSA in January, 2001. The additional security features are incorporated into Linux by superimposing the Flask architecture on its kernel. This architecture includes a security server that makes decisions as to whether particular subjects i.e., processes may be granted particular permissions to particular objects. The decisions are made in accordance with a security policy that is a combination of a type enforcement TE policy, a role-based access control RBAC policy, and, optionally, a m ultilevel security MLS policy. Associated with SE Linux is a policy language in which these various parts of the security policy can be de ned. An important issue with respect to a given policy is whether it achieves the high level goals for which i t i s i n tended. Because the policy language is aimed at a detailed speci cation of which access permissions may b e granted, the relation of a given policy to its high level goals is not obvious. Because policy speci cations tend to be very detailed and complex e.g., the speci cation of the example security policy accompanying the SE Linux release is over 80 pages long, establishing that the policy achieves any particular high level goal cannot simply be done by inspection. For the analysis of policies, tool support is clearly needed. To make it practical for members of the open source software community to analyze security policies that they de ne, this tool support needs to be usable by members of this community. This paper reports progress made towards adapting the tool TAME, a PVS interface designed to support speci cation and analysis of automata in a user-friendly manner, to the analysis of SE Linux security policies. It describes a general approach to modeling an SE Linux security policy as an automaton, expressing its security goals as automaton properties, and applying TAME. It also describes the progress made in applying this approach to a subset of the example security policy in the SE Linux release.
Introduction
In January 2001, the National Security Agency issued its initial release of Security-Enhanced SE Linu x , a v ersion of Linux with added security features. The purpose of the SE Linux release is to be an initial step towards providing the means for open source software developers to make their software more secure. Accompanying the SE Linux release is a policy language and an example security policy de ned using this language. The policy language allows a developer to specify three aspects of the policy: a type enforcement TE component, a role-based access control RBAC component, and a multilevel security MLS component. It is hoped by NSA that open source software developers will accompany their software with policies that ensure that their applications meet appropriate security goals.
To provide for policy enforcement in SE Linux, the Flask architecture 10 is superimposed upon the Linux kernel. In this architecture, a security server determines from the de nition of a policy whether any given request by a process for a particular permission to a particular object may be granted. A policy described in the SE Linux policy language is compiled by a program checkpolicy into an internal form understandable to the security server.
With respect to policy correctness, there are at least three important questions to ask about any individual policy:
Is the policy compiled correctly? I.e., is its internal form equivalent to its de nition? Is the policy correctly enforced by the security server? Does the policy, as deduced from the semantics of its de nition in the policy language, meet a given set of security goals?
Answering the rst two questions requires understanding the internal form of a policy and veri cation of the security server code. The project described in this paper addresses the third question, which one might a priori expect to be independent of details of the actual SE Linux code.
Any policy de ned in the SE Linux policy language will be intended to accomplish a set of security goals. The documentation accompanying the SE Linux release describes a set of eight security goals for the example policy in the release 9 . However, it is not immediately obvious that a given policy achieves particular security goals. Because the policy language is designed to specify mandatory access control at a detailed level, the analysis required to determine whether the goals are achieved is too complex to do by inspection. To perform such an analysis, tool support is clearly required. To encourage open source developers to analyze the policies they de ne with respect to their security goals, this tool support needs to be usable by software developers.
The project described in this paper has two goals. Ultimately, the goal is to produce a methodology and associated tool support permitting developers to analyze their policies. As intermediate goal is to rst demonstrate this methodology and tool support on the example security policy accompanying the SE Linux release. The tool support is to be based on TAME, a specialized interface to PVS that provides user-friendly support for specifying and proving properties of automata models. Archer, et al. Analyzing SE Linux Policies 3 One essential requirement that must be met before either of our above goals can be achieved is to have a precise semantics for the SE Linux policy language; without such a semantics, it is impossible to prove any properties of a policy de ned in the language. Because the description provided in the SE Linux documentation is very informal, relying heavily on examples, the initial phase of the project has been to formalize this semantics.
The policy de nition accompanying the SE Linux release is extremely complex, covering over 80 pages, even with macros to allow individual rules to cover many cases. Because our intermediate goal|demonstrating the methodology and tool on the example policy|is essentially a feasibility study, we have chosen a subset of the full example policy on which to perform the initial demonstration.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our overall approach, which has six phases. The next six sections describe our progress in terms of these six phases towards developing a general methodology and applying it to an example. In particular: Section 3 describes our formalization of the policy language semantics; Section 4 describes our general approach to representing a security policy with a state machine; Section 5 discusses the representation of security goals as state machine properties in general, and describes how the security goals stated in 9 can be represented as state machine properties; Section 6 describes the policy subset we h a ve c hosen for our initial study; Section 7 describes how TAME can beused to check properties of a security policy; and Section 8 describes our plans for technology transfer. Finally, Section 9 discusses some of the di culties and questions that have arisen in developing our state machine model, and Section 10 presents our conclusions.
Approach
Our approach to developing a methodology with tool support that can be used by developers in the open source software community has six stages:
1. Develop a precise formal description of the policy language and its semantics. 2. Develop a general state machine model for the system to which a security policy is to be applied. 3. Develop a method by which to express policy goals as properties of the state machine model. 4. Choose a small subset of the policy accompanying the SE Linux release that will serve as an initial example application for our methodology. 5 . Use TAME to analyze the reduced model with respect to the policy goals for the SE Linux release. 6. Technology transfer: Document the methodology and adapt TAME appropriately to make use of the methodology and TAME feasible for open source developers without deep knowledge of mechanical theorem proving. Our progress in following this approach is detailed below.
The Policy Language
The SE Linux security policy language is described in 8 , part of the documentation accompanying the SE Linux release. The language description in 8 is somewhat informal, and is mostly given by example. Some of the language constructs are not fully de ned in 8 ; however, most of the constructs used in the example policy accompanying the release have reasonably complete descriptions.
This section summarizes the language constructs mentioned in 8 that relate to TE and RBAC policies, and gives our understanding of their purposes. Our attempt at a formal description of the syntax and semantics of the various constructs is given in Appendix A.
The SE Linux policy language has four kinds of statements: declarations, rules, constraints, and assertions. Declarations include role declarations and type declarations. Rules include access vector rules, which govern decisions made by the security server about access requests, and transition rules, which g o vern possible role changes of an object and type-enforcement type assignments to newly created objects. Constraints constrain the manner in which v arious access permissions can be applied to various objects. Assertions are statements about whether or not certain kinds of access permissions are ever allowed by the policy. While the declarations, rules, and constraints are enforced by the security server at run time, the assertions are checked by the policy compiler checkpolicy at policy compile time. Thus, assuming checkpolicy works correctly, the assertions can be used as simple properties of the security policy that are available as lemmas in the proof of more complex properties such a s i n variants capturing high level security goals.
Each language statement consists of a keyword e.g., allow" for the most typical access vector rules followed by arguments that are expressed by using other language elements such a s type names, role names, object classes, attributes, and permissions. The particular sets of representatives of these elements can depend on the particular policy being de ned and the particular Linux con guration for which it is being de ned|e.g., the particular kernel modules present. The sets tend to be quite large. In the example policy with the SE Linux release, there are 3 role names, 28 object classes, 22 attributes, 115 permissions, and 253 type names of which 21 are parameterized|meaning there is an unbounded numberoftype names. The size problem is handled by the de nition of macros for sets of permissions, sets of attributes, sets of object classes, etc. These macros can be used in place of individual arguments in the syntax for the statements described in Appendix A.
A General State Machine Model
A state machine model can be speci ed by de ning 1 a set of states, 2 a n initial state or set of initial states, and 3 a set of possible state transitions. Archer, et al. Analyzing SE Linux Policies 5 Modeling the workings of an SE Linux security policy requires an abstract state machine that captures the security-relevant features of the system subject to the policy. Modeling states. One role of the security policy is to de ne the mandatory access control policy of the system by determining the kinds of access which the subjects i.e., processes of the system may have to the system objects e.g., le objects, process objects, etc.. In SE Linux, each object has an associated security context consisting of a set of features including a TE type, a user, a role, and if relevant, a multi-level security level. Since access control decisions are based on security contexts, a state in the state machine model must include representations of the objects of the system, and include a security context in the representation of each object. This information can be kept in a state variable objects.
Typical security goals involving changes to an object only consider whether or not the object could have been changed. To model changes to le objects, we associate an abstract content" in the form of a natural number with each object, which starts at 0 and is incremented each time a change could have happened.
The security policy may contain information on when to audit certain requests for permissions. In this case, the state must keep track of audit information. Conceptually, this information is kept in a special le object. However, we expect to model audit information as a separate state variable audit in order to simplify both the notion of content" of a le object and the retrieval of audit information from the state. The exact representation of this information may change if a description is provided of how auditing in SE Linux is expected to be used; there currently seems to be no such description. Modeling the initial state. The initial state chosen for the state machine model will vary with the subset of the SE Linux security policy that is being modeled. In our initial subset see Section 6, we expect to model the system after it has been initialized and ready for a user to log in. For this subset, the initial state will include among its objects the login daemon, standard system software executables, etc. To model how the security policy controls system initialization, a di erent, more primitive initial state would be needed. Modeling state transitions. Security contexts can be a ected by transitions such as type transitions and role transitions. A further role of the security policy beyond determining access control decisions is to de ne the permissible transitions. Therefore, the state transitions in the state machine model must re ect both access control decisions and possible modi cations to security contexts.
In the Flask architecture see 10 , transitions of the system are triggered by actions called user requests". These requests are made to the object manager", which consults the security server before handling them. It seems clear that the transitions in the state machine model must correspond to the user requests. However, the term user request" can be used to describe requests at various levels. For example, a shell level command might bea user request; at a lower level, so might a system call; at an even lower level, so might a request to begranted a permission. A combination of criteria led us to decide that the system call is the best choice of user request to associated with an individual state transition in our model. First, transitions should have an easily described e ect on the state of our model. Second, there should be a relatively small and well-de ned set of distinct requests. Individual permission checks do not meet the rst criterion, and neither permission checks nor shell level commands meet the second.
The documentation of the security policy in the SE Linux release provides details as to the permission checks needed for individual system calls, providing a natural way to tie the access decisions de ned by the security policy to the system calls. One complication, however, is that when SE Linux processes a system call and some necessary permission is denied, any remaining permissions checks are skipped. Exactly which ones are skipped can only bedetermined from looking at the kernel code 7 . To keep the abstract model of the system as simple as possible, we instead perform the full set of permission checks. This can make the model diverge from the actual system if any permission check with a side e ect is done in the model when it would not bedone in the system. However, since the only side e ects of permission checks appear to be accumulation of audit information, and since this audit information does not play any obvious role in achieving the security goals in 9 , we consider this divergence to be normally harmless.
We have written pseudo-code to describe the arguments to and e ects of those system calls that are relevant to the policy and system subset described below in Section 6 that we have chosen for our initial example. Details of our method for selecting the subset of system calls and for arriving at our pseudo-code representations for these system calls are provided in Appendix C.
Determining the e ects of the various system calls is straightforward from the Linux documentation. However, the e ect of an automaton action based on a system call depends on whether the necessary permissions are granted. Requiring that all the needed permissions be granted places a precondition on the action. The complete transition function of the automaton requires computation of these preconditions based on the security policy speci cation. Because of the complexity o f this speci cation, great care must be taken in organizing this computation for e ciency.
Expressing Security Goals as State Machine Properties
It is preferable, when possible, to capture policy goals as invariant properties of the state machine. These invariant properties have two avors: state invariants properties of all reachable states and transition invariants properties of the pairs of states in all reachable transitions. The reason for preferring Archer, et al. Analyzing SE Linux Policies 7 invariant properties is that they are simpler to establish with a theorem prover than other types of properties. As will be discussed below, many of the security goals in 9 for the policy in the SE Linux release can beexpressed in terms of state or transition invariants. However, no cut-and-dried general methodology for expressing security goals as state machine properties can be given. The best one can hope for is some general guidelines and a set of examples to use as models.
Policy goals formulated as state machine properties must be expressed in terms of the state variables of the state machine used to model the workings of the policy. Thus, it is necessary to develop the state machine model for the policy before formalizing its security goals. The advantage to formalizing the goals is that it makes the intent o f t h e goals unambiguous. For example, one of the goals for the SE Linux release is to protect the integrity of the kernel". A precise formal version of this goal would make clear what is meant by i n tegrity, and would clarify such issues as whether anything may change the kernel e.g., whether a new module can be added.
The eight high level security goals described in 9 for the policy in the SE Linus release are as follows:
1. Control various forms of raw access to data. 2. Protect the integrity of the kernel. 3. Protect the integrity of the system software, system con guration information, and system logs i.e., only the system administrator can modify the system software. 4. Con ne potential damage from exploitation of a aw in a process that requires privileges. 5. Protect privileged processes from executing malicious code. 6. Protect the administrator role and domain from being entered without user authentication. 7. Prevent ordinary user processes from interfering with system processes or administrator processes. 8. Protect users and administrators from the exploitation of aws in the netscape browser by malicious mobile code. Except for some paraphrasing in items 3 and 4 above, this list is quoted verbatim from 9 . Below, we give some examples of how many of these goals can be expressed in terms of state invariants or transition invariants:
Goal 1 can be expressed in terms of state invariants of the form In any state, only subjects having security context i can have permission j to objects having security context k", where i, j, and k need to be speci ed by the policy designer. These invariants may need to be supplemented by i n variants of the form Subject name can never have security context i" or A subject with initial security context c can never acquire security context i". The latter can be expressed as a state invariant if object histories are maintained as part of the current v alue of the object in the state machine model. Goals 2 and 3 can both beexpressed in terms of transition invariants of the form If an action changes the content of an object with security context i, then the action must have resulted from a successful request of a subject with security context j". Goal 4 can be expressed in terms of similar transition invariants, of the form If an action changes the content of an object with security context i, then the action must have resulted from a successful request of a subject with security context j 1 , ::: , o r j n ", where the security contexts i covers the objects which one does not want a subject with security context k 6 2 fj 1 , ::: , j n g to be able to a ect. Goal 6 can be expressed as the transition invariant If an action results in the subject entering a security context corresponding to an administrator role or domain, then the subject must have had its authentication value set in the prestate of the transition". This requires that process objects potential subjects have as part of their representation in the model an associated value indicating their authentication status. Goal 7 can beexpressed in terms of transition invariants of the form If an action changes the state of a system or administrator process object, then it is not the result of a request by an ordinary user process object". Note that it generally takes several invariants to express a security goal. The invariants sketched above clearly cannot bestated more precisely until the variables and actions in the state machine model have been speci ed. Moreover, the ability to capture some of the goals, e.g., Goals 6 and 7, in terms of the abstract state machine model relies on the model being su ciently detailed. In particular, the invariants for Goal 7 require a reasonable abstract representation of the state of a process object to be included in the model, beyond the integer to represent content that is su cient to capture changes in the state of a le object.
Because the goals are stated in such v ague terms, precise details such as the values to assign to the security context parameters cannot really be determined. Such details would have to beprovided by the designers of the security policy, who no doubt have a more precise notion of the intentions of the various goals.
Choosing an Initial Policy Subset
To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, we model a small but useful subset of the example policy which accompanies the SE Linux release. Our chosen subset is the portion of the original system necessary for a single user to operate on a minimal level. We assume that the system has already been booted and properly 9 initialized. The subset includes the procedures for login and password changing as well as the usual operations on les and directories. Programs not necessary to the basic functioning of the operating system, such as the X server, the gnome pty helper, mail, printing, mount, logrotate, at, and cron, are eliminated. Kernel module utilities and System V inter-process communication are also excluded from the subset. The SE Linux classes associated with Linux capabilities and security a ware applications have also been eliminated. Elimination of a particular program was done by removing the type declarations associated with the program and all references to those types in rules. Particular classes were removed by eliminating all rules that refer to those classes.
The subset also abstracts away some of the detail related to hardware interaction. Programs such as the card manager, the advanced power management system, and the console mouse server are exluded from the subset. The hardware devices, which are les in the system, are retained in the subset because some of them are needed for the ioctl system calls.
All networking capabilities are excluded from the subset, as are the network communications programs rlogin, rpc, rsh, ssh, and tcp. All sockets are excluded, except for Unix datagram sockets, which are used for inter-process communication. Also excluded are Netscape, NFS, and programs which help facilitate networking such as ypbind, ifcon g, inetd, and NIS.
The set of system calls used to form the set of transitions in the model see Appendix C is used to further reduce the example policy. These system calls do not require all of the possible permissions for the classes of objects remaining in the system. Thus, all rules relating to permissions unused by the system calls are eliminated.
The reduced system is signi cantly smaller than the original example policy, as shown by the statistics below. The remaining subset is still large enough to allow the formulation of properties related to most of the security goals from 9 in Section 5. The reduced system still retains the various hardware devices and processes that need to access them, allowing properties related to Goal 1 to beanalyzed. Though we assume the system is booted, we retain the les containing the code for booting and can thus check for access to these les. We also retain rules involving transitions to the type of the initialization process, allowing us to analyze whether there are any processes that can improperly transition to the initialization process. Both of these inclusions make it possible to formulate properties related to Goal 2. System software, con guration information, and log les remain in the subsystem, as do some programs that need access to those various types of les, allowing Goal 3 to bestudied. Properties related to Goals 4 and 5 can beformulated because the reduced system retains the login process, which is privileged. The reduced system contains the administrator role and domain, as well as the login and newrole programs, which are necessary for Goal 6 to be analyzed. Properties related to Goal 7 can beformulated because there are user, system, and administrator processes remaining in the system.
SE
After the reduced policy has been analyzed to see if it satis es the security goals, eliminated programs could bereintroduced and the resulting policy analyzed. Some portions of the example policy, such as that associated with booting and initializing the system, could be independently analyzed.
7. Analyzing the State Machine Model of a Policy with TAME TAME 4,1 is an interface to PVS designed to simplify the speci cation of automata models and proofs of automata properties, especially invariant properties. To specify an automaton, the user lls in the TAME template, providing the information shown in Figure 1 numeric, these types must be de ned in type declarations. The major state variable objects in our general model for SE Linux describes a set of objects with associated characteristics. The most convenient w ay to represent objects in PVS is as a function that takes a unique object identi er e.g., a unique path name and returns a record of its characteristics e.g., user, TE type, role, MLS level, abstract content, etc.. This very complex type for objects requires several supporting type declarations. Other auxiliary de nitions that may beneeded in a given speci cation are function de nitions and axioms. Auxiliary function denitions are especially useful in layering" the de nition of the transition function trans and the precondition function enabled specific so that these de nitions can beexpanded only to the extent needed in reasoning about individual state transitions. TAME also provides a standard set of steps for reasoning about invariant properties of automata. The most commonly used steps are shown in Figure 2 . The TAME proof steps have proved su cient to prove invariant properties in a wide set of applications; see, for example, 3,4,2 . In addition to the proof steps shown in Figure 2 , an automatic proof strategy based on these steps has been developed for proving invariant properties of automata speci ed in the SCR toolset 5 . This automatic strategy has been used to prove properties of a moderate sized SCR example 6 . An associated analysis strategy helped in nding a counterexample to a property that was not an invariant. The layered nature of the representation of the transition function of the TAME representation of an SCR speci cation was used to advantage in designing the automatic proof strategy for SCR speci ciations for e ciency. There is hope that analogous layering in the TAME representation of SE Linux models can be used to similar advantage.
The TAME step APPLY INV LEMMA in Figure 2 is used for applying other invariant lemmas in the course of the proof of the current i n variant lemma. It is typical for desired system invariants to require auxiliary invariants in their proofs. Experience has shown that for SCR automata, many of the needed auxiliary invariants are among the invariants automatically generated by the invariant generation algorithm in the SCR toolset. The automatic SCR proof strategy uses these automatically generated invariants when they are needed. In principle, it is not necessary to establish the automatically generated invariants using TAME; they can instead beincluded as axioms. As noted in Section 3, we hypothesize that the assertions" in an SE Linux policy description can beused to support proofs of SE Linux policy invariants in analogy to the way the automatically generated invariants support proofs of more complex invariants in SCR.
Plans for Technology Transfer
Specifying the system model in TAME for a security policy de ned in the SE Linux policy language requires extracting certain information from the policy de nition and formulating this information appropriately for use in lling out the TAME template. The example policy subset that we are using as a feasibility study provides the basis for determining the information that needs to be extracted and how it will be used in TAME. Enabling practitioners such a s o p e n source software developers to create TAME models for their security policies will initially be done by means of documentation illustrated by our example. In the farther future it would be desirable to create a policy-to-TAME compiler.
To make TAME itself more accessible for developers, we expect to adapt both the speci cation and the proof support of TAME for SE Linux security policies. Because many aspects of TAME models of policies|such a s the state variable objects and much of its type structure|will be common to all models, the TAME template can bere ned into a specialized version for policy models that includes template features for these common parts. One common feature, the overall structure of the representation of the access control decisions of the security policy, can be used to advantage in designing e cient specialized proof steps for use in proving security policy properties. As discussed in Section 7, there is hope that a strategy that can prove many i n variant properties automatically can be designed for SE Linux security policies in analogy to the automatic strategy for SCR speci cations. If so, this would greatly increase the accessibility of TAME to software developers with no experience of theorem proving.
Discussion: Problems to Be Solved
To develop a model for the example SE Linux security policy or a subset, several problems resulting from the size and complexity of the example policy must be solved. The rst problem is to decide just what state information needs to be represented in the model. As noted in Section 5, the answer to this depends on the properties one wishes to prove of the policy. 13 The next problem is to nd an appropriate representation of the mechanism used by the the security server to make access control decisions. Ideally, a l a yered representation could befound that would allow decisions to bemade e ciently based on least information. The layering could then beused in organizing the data structure used by the transition function in the state machine model.
The example policy is expressed relatively compactly by means of macros. When these macros are expanded, the full example policy expands to several tens of thousands of allow rules. It is clearly necessary to imitate the macros used in the policy de nition when creating the state machine model of the policy. Doing so may provide part of the answer to nding an appropriate layered representation for the access control decisions.
Already mentioned in Section 4 is the question of how to represent the e ect on the state of user requests system calls whose associated permissions are only partly granted, when asking for a permission may lead to audit information being kept. Modeling this situation precisely can only be done by referring to the SE Linux source code, a thing to beavoided. Our proposed solution is to settle for a model that is not guaranteed to be precise about audit information.
Conclusions
The major di culties associated with undertaking to prove properties of an SE Linux security policy as invariants of an appropriate state machine model arise from the sheer size of the policy description, which results from its low-level nature. Experience with applying mechanized support to the analysis of even relatively small systems has shown that speci cation errors are almost certain to be found even in system speci cations that have been carefully scrutinized by many people prior to the mechanized analysis. Thus, one can expect that such an intricate policy as the one in the SE Linux release will leave some unexpected loopholes.
A more feasible approach to producing a policy known to have a desired set of high-level properties is to obtain it by compiling a high-level policy speci cation that is more amenable to analysis. A high-level policy de nition language is de nitely desirable 7 .
In the absence of such a high-level language, it can be useful to model subsets of the full policy to search for loopholes. Provided these subsets include all of the policy relevant to some subset of Linux, any loophole found by this means will be a loophole in the full policy.
Appendix

A. Semantics of the SE Linux Policy Language
Language statements in the SE Linux policy language come in four avors: declarations, rules, constraints, and assertions. Assertions are checked against the others at policy compile time. The others are enforced by the SE Linux kernel. The statements described below are not the full set mentioned in the SE Linux domumentation, but do at least cover those actually found in the TE and RBAC policy descriptions for the example policy in the SE Linux release. The Remarks" section in the description for a particular statement refer either to the uses of that statement in the example policy or to certain les of the policy descriptions. Caveat: the exact les and le contents in the policy description are likely to change over time. Our references are to the versions we captured on April 12, 2001.
A.1. Declarations role declarations
Syntax: role role-name types types Examples:
role system_r types initial_boot_t;
Remarks: There is only one example of role in the TE policy, in policy init.te. Most role declarations are in the RBAC policy in policy rbac.
Semantics: Declares a new role role-name and specifies the set of types types that may be "entered" by a process in role role-name . Remarks: There is supposedly an optional aliases argument, but we have found no uses of it.
There are 253 type declarations in the TE policy, several of them parameterized.
Semantics: Declares a new type typename which has the attributes listed in attributes .
A.2. Rules
According to the language description provided in 8 , there are four kinds of access vector rules, namely: allow, auditallow, auditdeny, and notify. Only two of these, allow and auditdeny, are used in the TE policy. Quoting from 8 :
These four kinds of rules de ne the corresponding access vectors returned by security compute av. If no rule is speci ed, then no permissions are returned in allowed, auditallow, or notify, and all permissions are returned in auditdeny. All permissions are always returned in the decided access vector, since the TE policy does not defer the computation of any permissions. ... Each access vector rule has a source type eld, a target type eld, a class eld, and a permissions eld. Thus, in particular, any permission not explicitly allowed is denied and audited.
Most of the rules we describe below can be used in more compact form by using sets of types, objects, and permissions as arguments where a single type, object, or permission is speci ed below. The interpretation of rules stated with such plurals" is the same as the set of rules obtained by choosing each possible combination of singular" arguments. An exception is the last type argument in a type transition or type change or type memberrule, which m ust name a single type because it represents the necessarily unique default type to be assigned to a new or transformed object. There are several ways to represent sets: e.g., one can use 1 a comma-separated list in curly braces, 2 an attribute name to represent the set of types with that attribute, or 3 in front of an individual or a set to represent its complement. allow rules Syntax: allow type1 type2 : object class permission Examples: allow sysadm_t file_t:dir_file_class_set *; allow $1 netmsg_type:tcp_socket connectto acceptfrom ;
Remarks: There are 708 allow rules, most of them parameterized. The parameter $1 in the example rule above can be any of the many types to which the can_network macro is applied.
Semantics: Grant the requested permission. Specifically, grant the permission permission to any subject of "source type" type1 with respect to an object of "target type" type2 and "class" object class .
Example 1: allow domain init_t:process sigchld;
Explanation given: This rule grants every domain the ability to send a SIGCHLD signal to init, so that init can reap every process. Remarks: The above are the only uses of auditdeny in the TE policy. The only values used for $1 above are "user", "sysadm", and "polyadm".
Semantics: If the requested permission is denied, keep audit information about it. Specifically, record any denial of the permission permission to any subject of "source type" type1 with with respect to any object of "target type" type2 and "class" object class . Remarks: The above are the only uses of type_change in the TE policy. $1 is the "domain_prefix" argument to the macro user_domain. The macro user_domain is applied only to the arguments "user", "sysadm", and "polyadm".
Semantics: For any object of type type2 and class object class , relabel the object with the type type3 when a subject of type type1 accesses the object.
The "accesses" part is just a guess; to see what this really does, one presumably has to look at the code for the security server.
type member rules Syntax: type_member type1 type2 : object class type3
Examples: type_member polyadm_t poly_t:dir poly_t; type_member $1_t poly_t:dir $1_home_t; Remarks: The above are the only two uses of type_member in the TE policy. $1 is the "domain_prefix" argument to the macro user_domain. The macro user_domain is applied only to the arguments "user", "sysadm", and "polyadm". Remarks: The above are the only uses of type_transition in the TE policy.
$1, $2, and $3 in the first example are the arguments to the macro domain_auto_trans; in the second and third examples they are the arguments to the macro file_type_auto_trans. Both of these macros are applied to many different sets of arguments in the policy.
$1 in the fourth example is the domain_prefix argument to the can_create_pty macro, which is applied only to rlogind, sshd, and to the argument of the user_domain macro which is only applied to "user", "sysadm", and "polyadm".
$1 and $2 in the fifth example are the domain_prefix and other_domain arguments of the can_create_other_pty macro, which is used only within the gph_domain macro, applied to $1_gph and $1, where $1 is the argument to the gph_domain macro. The gph_domain macro, in turn, is applied only to the argument of the user_domain macro, which is only applied to "user", "sysadm", and "polyadm".
Semantics: If object class is "process", then the default type of any process object created from an executable of type type2 by an object of type1 will be type3 rather than type2 .
If object class is a file object class, then the default type assigned to an object of class object class created in a directory of type type2 by an object of type type1 will be type3 rather than type2 .
role transition rules Syntax: role_transition role1 type role2
Examples: role_transition $1 $2 $3
Remarks: The above example, which occurs in the definition of the macro role_auto_trans, is the only use of role_transition in the RBAC policy; because role_auto_trans is not used at all, neither is role_transition.
Semantics: The default role of a process created from an executable of type type by forking a process of role role1 is role2 rather than role1 .
A.3. Constraints constrain statements
Syntax: constrain object class permission expression
Examples: constrain process transition u1 == u2 or t1 == privuser ; constrain process transition r1 == r2 or t1 == privrole ; constrain dir_file_class_set create relabelto relabelfrom u1 == u2 or t1 == privowner ; constrain socket_class_set create relabelto relabelfrom u1 == u2 or t1 == privowner ;
Remarks: The file "constraints" in the "policy" directory gives the following description of the syntax of constraints: Restrict the ability to transition to other users or roles to a few privileged types.
The semantics for the second two examples is given as:
Restrict the ability to label objects with other user identities to a few privileged types.
The most probable interpretation is: A subject may apply the permission permission to an object of class object class only under the constraints denoted by the expression expression . In any expression, u1, r1, and t1 refer to the user, role, and type associated with the object before the permission is used, and u2, r2, and t2 refer to the user, role, and type that would be associated with the object after the permission were used. The symbol == can be used to denote membership in a set of types e.g., possession of an attribute such as privuser.
A.4. Assertions neverallow statements Syntax: neverallow types object permissions Examples: neverallow~ kmod_t insmod_t rmmod_t ifconfig_t self:capability sys_module; neverallow~klogd_t proc_kmsg_t:file~stat_file_perms;
Remarks: Found only in policy assert.te. The validity of these assertions is checked by the program "checkpolicy".
Semantics: Asserts that no permission in permissions is ever given to any entity of a type in types with respect to object . 
